Post by markdsouza on Oct 17, 2013 19:14:39 GMT
Here's something interesting (to my geeky mind anyway). In R v Oye [2013] EWCA Crim 1725 (attached), the Court of Appeal was asked to consider whether an insane person could prefer a self-defence claim based on the delusions generated by his insanity. D had a psychotic episode which led him to believe that he was being attacked by evil spirits, and so he lashed out against these evil spirits to defend himself. In doing so, he injured V. The twin defences of self-defence and insanity were pressed before the CA (self-defence being D's preferred option). Under S.76 of the CJIA, 2008, the question of whether D used a reasonable amount of defensive force should be assessed by reference to the circumstances as D subjectively perceived them, even if D was wrong, and D's belief was unreasonable. So the defence argued (and the prosecution did not contest) that the key question was whether D used force that was reasonable in the circumstance of being attacked by evil spirits! The prosecution argued that D's force was an excessive response to an attack by evil spirits (!) – and the jury convicted (!!)
The CA weren't keen on allowing the self-defence claim either, so they just said that there was enough material to support the jury's finding (which must have been that D used more force than was necessary to repel an attack by these evil spirits). But obiter, they expressed unease at the notion that we should judge D on the basis of the circumstances that D's insane delusion led him to perceive. They said:
[45] If this is right, the potential implications for other cases are most disconcerting. It could mean that the more insanely deluded a person may be in using violence in purported self-defence the more likely that an entire acquittal may result. It could mean that such an individual who for his own benefit and protection may require hospital treatment or supervision gets non. It could mean that the public is exposed to possible further violence from an individual with a propensity for suffering insane delusions, without any intervening preventative remedies being available to the court in the form of hospital or supervision orders. Thus, whatever the purist force in the argument, there are strong policy objections to the approach advocated on behalf of the appellant.
[46] In our view it is not right.
[47]…[Under s 76 of the 2008 Act] An insane person cannot set the standards of reasonableness as to the degree of force used by reference to his own insanity...
But nothing in the words of S.76 excludes even insanely deluded beliefs from forming the circumstantial backdrop of D's claim to self-defence. I think the CA reached the right conclusion, but how does one square that conclusion with the express words of the statute? I think this is one of those instances in which doctrine can be justified on the basis of a theoretical argument about the structure of the criminal law – the argument that the insanity plea (which denies responsibility) is logically prior to, and therefore trumps any claim to justification or excuse. Any thoughts?
By the way, the CA eventually handed down a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity for D, and because D had since recovered, ordered an absolute discharge. But what if the cause of D's delusion hadn't been an (internal) disease of the mind, and had instead been brought about by an external cause for which D was not to blame – say a concussion? Should D have been able to press his self-defence claim on the basis of the 'facts' in his delusion then? Based on the wording of S.76, I think so!
The CA weren't keen on allowing the self-defence claim either, so they just said that there was enough material to support the jury's finding (which must have been that D used more force than was necessary to repel an attack by these evil spirits). But obiter, they expressed unease at the notion that we should judge D on the basis of the circumstances that D's insane delusion led him to perceive. They said:
[45] If this is right, the potential implications for other cases are most disconcerting. It could mean that the more insanely deluded a person may be in using violence in purported self-defence the more likely that an entire acquittal may result. It could mean that such an individual who for his own benefit and protection may require hospital treatment or supervision gets non. It could mean that the public is exposed to possible further violence from an individual with a propensity for suffering insane delusions, without any intervening preventative remedies being available to the court in the form of hospital or supervision orders. Thus, whatever the purist force in the argument, there are strong policy objections to the approach advocated on behalf of the appellant.
[46] In our view it is not right.
[47]…[Under s 76 of the 2008 Act] An insane person cannot set the standards of reasonableness as to the degree of force used by reference to his own insanity...
But nothing in the words of S.76 excludes even insanely deluded beliefs from forming the circumstantial backdrop of D's claim to self-defence. I think the CA reached the right conclusion, but how does one square that conclusion with the express words of the statute? I think this is one of those instances in which doctrine can be justified on the basis of a theoretical argument about the structure of the criminal law – the argument that the insanity plea (which denies responsibility) is logically prior to, and therefore trumps any claim to justification or excuse. Any thoughts?
By the way, the CA eventually handed down a special verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity for D, and because D had since recovered, ordered an absolute discharge. But what if the cause of D's delusion hadn't been an (internal) disease of the mind, and had instead been brought about by an external cause for which D was not to blame – say a concussion? Should D have been able to press his self-defence claim on the basis of the 'facts' in his delusion then? Based on the wording of S.76, I think so!